THE CASE Of a Standing Army ARMY Fairly and Impartially STATED.

IN

A N S W E R

To the late Hiſtory of

STANDING ARMIES

IN

ENGLAND:

And other Pamphlets writ on that Subject.

LONDON: Printed in the Year, 1698.

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THE PREFACE.

I *Cannot but with Grief behold, how active ſome perſons have been of late, in contriving ways to divide us into Parties and Factions.* 'Tis *wonderful to imagine how many Arts and Stratagems they daily make uſe of to promote their* Ill Deſigns. *In the War time they were continually bellowing,* the *French* wou'd be too hard for us, and ſpin out the War, till we were ruin'd by the expence of it; *and that, talk what we wou'd,* it was impoſſible we ſhou'd ever bring our Potent Enemy to terms of Agreement, either ſafe or Honourable. *This was their Trick they us'd then, to compaſs the Nation's Ruin, by diſcouraging the People from aſſiſting with their Purſes, the endeavours of his Majeſty; but God be thanked, the Wiſdom of our Parliaments, and the Love the People bore his Majeſty, caus'd us chearfully to carry on the War, to the wonder of our Enemies both at home and abroad, and Confuſion of all their dev'liſh Deſigns.*

And now, that we have bravely gain'd an Honourable Peace; they as Induſtriouſly wrack their wicked Inventions, to find means to rob us of the benefits we might hope from it, and render it ineffectual, by ſetting us in Flames at home, and embroiling us into Fatal Fewds, and Diſcontents; that if poſſible our Foreign Enemies may be oblig'd to them for what they were never able to do themſelves,

ſelves, and be forc'd for once to own, Engliſh *Wits have been ſharper than* French *Swords. To this end they ſhift Sails, and tell us, the* French *are weak and Impotent, and unable to attempt any thing againſt us, that conſequently a* Standing Army *is unneceſſary, and a needleſs expence; and leaſt the People ſhou'd not regard that, they fright them with Dangers, and Chimerical Bugbears. And ſeeing theſe Men's deſigns have, in both theſe changes, evidently endeavour'd the Intereſt of our Foreign Enemies; It is not at all abſurd to imagine they have had the handling of a few* Lewidores, *and then we need no longer wonder at their Actions; for that Mettal carries a great weight with it; and has a way of perſwading, which their corrupted Conſciences is no wiſe able to reſiſt; Nay leaſt we ſhou'd believe they cou'd, this Author has given us two Inſtances to the contrary; in hopes perhaps of reviving here the Trade of Bribery, which to their unſpeakable Grief has been Dead ſo long.*

This I believe, will afford us the true cauſe of their complaining of the ſplitting and Multiplying of Places, as he calls it; for indeed if any ſober man conſiders it, he can't but think it more ſafe; and that the Truſt is likelier to be manag'd with more Integrity in the hands of many, than one; for they are as a Guard or Watch upon one another: If there be but one honeſt man in Five, Seven, *or* Nine, *his example will oblige the reſt to be ſo too, leaſt they are found fault with; whereas there is not that obligation on a ſingle Perſon; But if there is not an honeſt man to be found in* Five, Seven, *or* Nine; *we are in a hopeleſs ſtate, and our Affairs in a deſperate Condition.*

If theſe Gentlemen were ſcatter'd among thoſe places, one among the Five, *another among the* Seven, *another a-*

mong

mong the Nine, *&c. then I ſuppoſe, 'twou'd be full as well, as if the Commiſſions were entruſted with ſingle Perſons; (themſelves expected) and the places wou'd be well manag'd to be ſure, tho' there were* Ninety Nine *joyn'd with them; ſo that 'tis plain their Quarrel do's not lye againſt the ſplitting of Offices; but they are angry that none of the ſplinters fell to their ſhare: They think they have as much capacity, and therefore as good pretenſions to preferment as any one. This is the ground of their Quarrels, and true reaſon of all their Complaints, and as we deal with peeviſh froward Children, the readieſt way to quiet them is to give them ſomething to* Play with.

In the following Pages I have endeavour'd to ſhew the Neceſſity of a Standing Force, *not as they do, by what was formerly in Uſe; but by conſidering the Preſent Circumſtances of things, which is the only true way of obtaining the right; for 'tis not what our Anceſtors did formerly, but what we ought to do now.*

Our Anceſtors acted according to the ſtate of their Affairs, and I dare affirm, if they were living now, they wou'd alter their Meaſures, to the preſent occaſions, and make no ſcruple of varying their Counſels as they ſaw neceſſity requir'd.

Such a Method of acting is a ſure ſign of Wiſdom, and ſeldom fail of ſucceſs; whereas never to alter, tho' there's Neceſſity for it, ſhews Poſitiveneſs in the higheſt degree; proves incureable folly, and ever ends in unpitied Miſery.

Theſe Gentlemen, wiſe in their own Conceits, are always inſtructing others; they have not patience to let the Wiſdom of the Nation act as they ſhall think fit; but by an impudent boldneſs they pretend to Model the Government, and regulate the Affairs of the Nation in a Club

Room,

Room, over a heap of Sot's Weed, with as much assurance as if they were all Privy Counsellors, and are as Dogmatical and Positive in what they advance, as if they had chous'd the Pope of his Infallibility.

They might have been so Civil as to have stay'd, to see what His Majesty's thoughts were, and what the Parliament will do in the business; since all good Men are assur'd, that His Majesty will never intend, nor the Parliament ever consent, to any thing, but what will be evidently for the Glory, Honour, *and* Safety *of these Nations.*

THE

THE CASE Of a Standing ARMY Freely and Impartially STATED, &c.

'TIS not at all ſtrange to ſee the beſt things Evil ſpoken of. The Wiſeſt Counſels and moſt Regular Conduct have often been ſeverely Cenſur'd even by thoſe who have largely ſhar'd their good Effects. There have been ſome in all Ages, who have had ſuch a predominant and unhappy mixture of Ill-nature in their Conſtitutions, that they have taken a pleaſure to

be always out of Humour, ever complaining and murmuring, never pleas'd with either good or bad Fortune; and since the whole delight of such wretches consists in a constant exercise of their Spleen, they take care never to want this dev'lish diversion, by continually employing themselves in finding faults in others; not putting themselves to the trouble of distinguishing between *Good*, and *Ill*, unless it be to bestow their bittersest Reproaches where they find the greatest Excellencies, because most directly opposite to their own Imperfections.

That this is the case of most of our *Malecontents* I believe we may be pretty sure; for it can easily be shewn, that the very *same* Persons have been *noted Grumbletonians* in the Luxurious and Effeminate Reign of *Charles* the II. the Arbitrary and Tyrannical Reign of the late King *James*, and still keep up their snarling Humours even in the Mild and Easie one of his present Majesty King *William*: So that 'tis plain the fault lies only in their own *corrupted Blood* and *vicious Tempers*.

That such People shou'd have any regard, or that any one shou'd be drawn in to mind or value, much less to cry up, their wicked Insinuations and mischeivous Complaints, which have no other source than the too great abundance of their Spleen, and their own settled ill dispositions, which no Art can correct or cure, is a very surprizing and sad Accident, and ought to be dreaded by every good person; for in the end the Consequences may prove very fatal and prejudicial.

Amongst

Amongſt theſe ſort of Men none have made a greater Noiſe or ſeem'd to have more plauſible pretences, than thoſe Perſons who have employ'd their Pens in terrifying the People with the danger of a Standing Army. *Liberty* is their Cry, a Glorious Topick indeed when it is not abus'd; but it has ever been made the Stalking-Horſe to all Deſigns, and dreſs'd up in as various ſhapes as the Wit and Cunning of Deſigning Perſons found neceſſary and convenient to their Ends and Purpoſes; 'tis an Argument very ſpecious and plauſible, never failing to dazle the Eyes of the Unthinking Vulgar, who run away with the word, and conſider no farther than the bare out-ſide of things.

Whether or no there lies any ill Deſigns, at the bottom of the preſent clamour againſt a Standing Army, I know not; but I am afraid of what might follow if theſe Gentlemens Notions were embrac'd, and their deſires ſatisfyed; I cannot but think we ſhou'd be in very ill Circumſtances if we were left Unguarded, and without Forces ſufficient to ſecure us from the Inſults of our Enemies; but I hope their ill counſels will never prevail to reduce us to ſo lamentable a condition, as to be more beholden to the Generoſity or Imprudence of an Enemy, than to our own Strength and Wiſdom.

Nay I dare engage, that theſe ſame Gentlemen, who are now ſo very hot for the Disbanding the Army, ſhou'd the Army be Disbanded, wou'd be ſo far from being better ſatisfied, or cur'd of the

ſpleenetick Humours they are overrun with, that they wou'd then make the *Want* of an Army the Grounds and Occaſions of new Complaints; they wou'd then with open Mouths, and a full Cry, and with ſomething more reaſon on their ſide, roar out, that we were neither ſafe nor ſecure, but left naked and defenceleſs to a Potent and Inveterate Enemy, who might, (if he pleas'd) make an eaſie Conqueſt of us, and quickly be Maſter both of our Lives and Eſtates; This wou'd then be the Outcry, and we ſhou'd be Impos'd on with the continual Alarms of an Invaſion from abroad, by the very *ſame* Perſons, who now endeavour to frighten us with the Loſs of our Freedom and Liberties by an Army at home; the grumbling Humor wou'd ſtill find ſomething to feed on, and preſerve it ſelf alive in ſpite of either Cure or Poiſon.

But to begin with our Author of the *Hiſtory of Standing Armies in* England; Page firſt he ſays, *If any Man doubts whether a ſtanding Army is Slavery, Popery, Mahometiſm, Paganiſm, Atheiſm, or any thing which they pleaſe.* How *Sir*, A *Standing Army* to be ſo many ſeveral things or what you pleaſe, this is ſtrange indeed, and if this is all, we need not fear; for to be every thing, or what you pleaſe, is to be nothing at all. I admire this Gentleman ſhou'd ſtumble on ſo odd a beginning; but to go on, *let him read firſt, the ſtory of* Matho *and* Spendius *at* Carthage; *Secondly, the Hiſtories of* Strada *and* Bentivoglio, *but where he will find what work Nine Thouſand* Spaniards *made in the 17 Provinces, tho'*

tho

the Country was full of fortified Towns, poſſeſs'd by the Low-Country Lords, and they had aſſiſtance from Germany, England *and* France. I think this one Paragraph is a direct Confutation of the whole Book; for if Nine Thouſand *Spaniards* well Diſciplin'd, made ſuch havock in the 17 Provinces, tho' the Country was full of fortified Towns, and in the Poſſeſſion of the Low-Country Lords, aſſiſted too by *Germany*, *England* and *France*; I think we, (who can't boaſt of many ſtrong fortified Towns, nor can't reaſonably expect any quick Aſſiſtance from Abroad,) ſhou'd think of keeping up a Force able and ſufficient to protect us in caſe of Neceſſity, and not of leaving our ſelves Open and Unguarded; this is ſo very obvious to the meaneſt degree of Senſe, that I wonder how theſe Gentlemen or any one elſe can have a thought to the contrary.

But he goes on confuting his own Notions; for he confeſſes *that we have always had an Eſtabliſh'd Force among us*, if ſo, then I think the diſpute may be brought into a narrow Compaſs; for the queſtion will not be, *if a Standing Force here is Legal*; for that's granted, but the queſtion will be, *what Forces are Neceſſary to be kept in Pay at this time*; which may be immediately reſolv'd, by conſidering what an Army is rais'd and kept in Pay for; and it is either to *Invade* and *Offend* our Enemies, or to be a *Security* and *Defence* to our ſelves, when we have reaſon to fear an Annoyance or Invaſion from Abroad; and I ſuppoſe all *Engliſhmen* will ſee the occaſion of a *Standing Force*, and a pretty large one too; for if

we have not an *Army ſufficient for our Security and Preſervation, we had as good have none*; ſo that all the pains this Gentleman has been at in computing the Forces now in Pay, on purpoſe to inſtill Fears and Jealouſies in the hearts of his Majeſty's good Subjects, is to no manner of purpoſe, unleſs it be to give us the greater reaſon to rejoyce in our Security, and to thank God that we are ſo well provided for our Defence. 'Tis true indeed we have juſt had a Peace; which gives theſe Gentlemen occaſion to ſay, that we have nothing to fear, and conſequently no Uſe for an Army, but if we conſider how apt a certain Prince is to diſturb and Invade his Neighbours, and how able he is at this time to do it; how often alſo he has found pretences to break the moſt Solemn Leagues, we ſhou'd quickly be convinc'd of the contrary, and find very good Grounds to fear an attempt upon us if we are not able to prevent it. In Page 3 he highly extolls the Merits of Queen *Elizabeth*, and deſervedly too, he tells us, *She aſſiſted the Dutch*, whereby She trained up her Subjects in the Art of War, *That She wou'd never permit them nor* France *to build any great Ships*; *kept the* Keys *of the* Maes *and* Scheld *in her own hands*; *and died with an uncontrol'd Dominion of the Seas, and Arbitreſs of Chriſtendom*; *all this She did with a Revenue not exceeding* 300000 *l.* per Annum, *and had but inconſiderable Taxes from her People.*

To diſpute with theſe Men, we muſt ſet things in a right Light. 'Tis plain, they built upon falſe ſuppoſitions, which few People obſerve, being dazled with

with the plauſibleneſs of their Arguments, and blinded with their pretended concern for their Country; but to argue truly upon the matter, and to ſtate the Caſe aright, we muſt conſider the Alterations, and Revolutions, that have happen'd in *Europe*, within theſe hundred Years. *France* is now arriv'd to a vaſt Height, 'tis now no more that *France* which we could Invade and almoſt Conquer at our pleaſure. We may indeed forbid them building great Ships, but I fancy they wou'd hardly mind us. Ships they have to compoſe a ſtrong and mighty Fleet, with Seamen able and experienc'd to Man them, great Armies at Land in conſtant Pay; this is a State far differing from what they were formerly; therefore we go a wrong way to work, when we *ſuppoſe them in the ſame condition they were in a hundred Years ago*, and build *Maxims for preſent uſe on thoſe ſuppoſitions*; for 'tis evident they are encreas'd to an incredible pitch in extent of their Country, Riches, and multitudes of the Inhabitants; that this is no groundleſs ſuppoſition, is very clear, by their being able to cope with a Confederacy of the moſt Potent Princes of *Europe* for ten Years together: As the Author of the account of *Denmark* ſays in his Preface, *we have lately bought the experience of this truth too dear not to be now ſenſible of it. 'Tis not very long ago ſince nothing was more generally believ'd (even by Men of the beſt Senſe) than that the Power of* England *was ſo unqueſtionably eſtabliſh'd at Sea, that no Force cou'd poſſibly ſhake it; that the* Engliſh *Valour and Manner of Fighting was ſo far beyond all others, that nothing was more deſirable than a War with* France. *Shou'd any*

one

one have been ſo regardleſs of his reputation at that time to have repreſented the French *an overmatch for the United Forces of* England *and* Holland; *or have ſaid, that we ſhou'd live to ſee our ſelves inſulted on our own Coaſts, and our Trade endanger'd by them, that we ſhou'd be in apprehenſions of an Invaſion and a* French *Conqueſt, ſuch a ventureſome Man muſt have expected to have paſs'd for a very Traveller, or at leſt, for an illnatur'd and unthinking Perſon, who little conſider'd what the reſiſtleſs Force of an* Engliſh *Arm was; but our late Experience has reclaim'd us from theſe Miſtakes: Our Fathers and Grand-Fathers told us indeed theſe things,* when they were true, *when our Yeomanry and Commonalty were every day Exercis'd in drawing* the Long Bow, *and handling* the Brown Bill, *with other Weapons* then in uſe, *wherein we excell'd all the World.*

To ſet this ſtill in a clearer Light, 'twill not be amiſs if we conſider the State of *England* in reſpect of what it was formerly; and I believe we may, without much thought, affirm that our Monarchy was at its higheſt pitch in the Reign of our glorious Queen *Elizabeth*, the remiſsneſs and careleſsneſs of ſome of the late Reigns have ſoften'd our Spirits, and brought a Luxury unknown to our Fore-Fathers in vogue among us, whereby we are degenerated from that old hardineſs and Fortitude, our Anceſtors were ſo famous for. This being the true State of the Caſe without partiality on either ſide; theſe Gentlemens Notions will naturally fall to peices; and I hope that true Engliſhmen will no longer ſuffer themſelves to be impos'd on by

a jingle of Words, that have only an empty ſound to recommend them; 'tis time I think to look about us, and conſider ſeriouſly on the matter, before we part with thoſe Forces that have ſo bravely fought for us Abroad, and are ſtill ſo willing and able to defend us at Home: but before I part with this Gentleman on this head, I can't but take notice of the ſly Inſinuation he makes of Queen *Elizabeth's* doing all thoſe great things with only 300000 *l. per Annum*, and ſome inconſiderable Taxes beſides; his deſign is that People ſhou'd immediately make reflections on the Taxes that have been rais'd to Maintain this War; but if this Gentleman had that Ingenuity he pretends to, he wou'd hinder ſuch Reflections, by letting us know that ſuch a Summ was more than 3 times as much in our Days, and that by her Privateers She took ſeveral Millions from the *Spaniards*, beſides the Cuſtoms and Intereſt were paid her by the *Dutch*, with theſe She did all thoſe great things: that She had but an Army between 1400 and 2000 Men in time of Peace is evidently falſe; for there were a greater Number than that requiſite to the Garriſoning of the Cautionary Towns in her hands in *Flanders*; but I think 'tis needleſs to follow him in his Hiſtorical Account of things, for they are very little, to his purpoſe, or indeed to any purpoſe at all.

In Page 19 he tells us, *That his preſent Majeſty was invited over, and landed at* Torbay, *publiſhing a Declaration, which ſet forth all the Oppreſſions of the late Reign*, (but the keeping up a Standing Army) *declar'd for a free Parliament, in which things*

were to be ſo ſettled, that there ſhou'd be no danger of falling again into Slavery; and promis'd to ſend back all his foreign Forces as ſoon as this was done.

Sure theſe Gentlemen imagine they may ſay any thing; they are great Inſtances of the Mildneſs of the preſent Government, when they are not brought to an Account, for taking ſuch Liberties both in their Speeches and Writings, to Inſinuate whatever they think may be prejudicial to thoſe above them; for to tell us that a *Standing Army* is certain Slavery, and to Inſinuate that his preſent Majeſty intended from the very firſt to maintain a *Standing Army*, is as plain as they can ſpeak, to aſperſe His Majeſty with what they daily experience to be falſe: ſuch Liberties are too bold, and that they are not call'd to Account for them, is plain demonſtration of the Idleneſs and Vanity of their Fears.

Here again he lays the blame of *Ireland*'s not being timely ſuccour'd on the Government, when we all know how earneſt His Majeſty was for the Relief of thoſe diſtreſſed People; tho' he tell us, that *Ireland* was neglected to be relieved, for a pretence for the raiſing a greater Army; I wou'd have theſe Gentlemen take care how they provoke Mercy.

In Page 21, he tells us, *the King acquainted the Parliament the 8th of* March, *when ſpeaking of the deplorable Condition of* Ireland, *that he thought it not adviſeable to undertake the reducing of it, with leſs than* 20000 *Horſe and Foot. This was a better Pill to the Parliament, who thought they might have managed their ſhare*

ſhare of the War with France *by a Fleet at Sea, but there was no Remedy, a greater Army muſt be rais'd, or* Ireland *loſt.* This Gentleman writes fiaſt I ſuppoſe, and ſeldom minds his Senſe. Did the Parliament think of Conquering *Ireland* by a Fleet? He wou'd have had them landed their Seamen, and left their Ships a prey to the *French.* We'll forgive him one blunder however, if he'll take care what he writes hereafter: but I admire how this Gentleman makes the Conqueſt of *Ireland* and a War with *France* the ſame thing; for I take them to be diſtinct: *Ireland* is our own Country, and when we fought for that, we fought for what was immediately our own, we were not at War with *France*, or any Foreign Prince, we were reducing a People, who were in actual Rebellion to the Crown of *England*, but we'll not quarrel about Terms; tho' by the way, the miſeries and hardſhips our Fellow Subjects of *Ireland* felt, ſhou'd make us terribly afraid of giving any Neighbouring Prince the leaſt hopes of ſucceeding in any Attempt upon us; for 'tis an undeniable Maxim, *that opportunity makes the Thief*, and by *Diſbanding* our Troops, we may poſſibly give ſome grounds for hopes of Succeſs to a Prince naturally Aſpiring and Ambitious, and very apt to fancy himſelf capable of doing more than he is able; but to return, I wou'd ask this Gentleman how he came to be ſo ſure *that the Parliament thought to have managed their ſhare of this War by a Fleet at Sea*, which he ſo poſitively aſſerts. We are all ſure that the Parliaments of *England* were of another mind in former Days, or they wou'd never have contributed ſo largely and liberally towards an Invaſion of *France* as they often did, Nay, in all our

Hiſtories, I never found they ever parted with their Money more heartily, than when it was for a War with that Country, and yet they never ſo much as dream't of their carrying on a War, only by a Fleet at Sea, but quite the contrary; for we all of us know, that our Kings very frequently Tranſported great Armies over into *Flanders*, *Normandy*, or ſome part of *France*, thinking it more adviſeable to Seat the War in an Enemies Country rather than their own. To give ſome Inſtances,

William the Conqueror enter'd *France* with a great Army. *William Rufus* Invaded *Normandy*, ſo did *Henry* the V. and *Richard* the I. *Henry* the III. twice Tranſported great Armies over to *France*. *Edward* the I. twice Invaded *France*. There were no leſs than five ſeveral Armies Tranſported over to *France* in the Reign of *Edward* the II. *Henry* the V. had continually an Army in *France*. Many more Inſtances might be given of the like nature, but theſe are enough to let us ſee, that in former times our Parliaments thought it no diminution to their Wiſdom to carry on their Warrs in Foreign Parts by Land-Forces; tho' in thoſe Days they were confeſſedly ſtronger at Sea than any of their Neighbours; and amongſt all our Princes we find none more belov'd, and extoll'd, than thoſe Martial Monarchs, who Tranſported and Headed their *Engliſh* Armies in Foreign Parts. Beſides, whoever do's but conſider how liberally and largely our late Parliaments have contributed towards the Expence of a ten Years War, and what a happy Agreement and Union there has been all along betwixt the King and them,

them, I ſay, whoever conſiders this, can by no means believe he ſpeakes truth, when he tells us, *that the Parliament thought they might have manag'd their ſhare of the War with* France *by a Fleet at Sea, and that they thought the raiſing a Land Force a bitter Pill.*

I think this Gentleman ſhould be requir'd to give a more publick account of this Aſſertion. To make us believe the King out-witted the Parliament, and that the Parliament themſelves acted diſagreeably to their own opinions, this is a New contrivance, and may in time produce very evil Conſequences. But I hope Men of Senſe will take care how they are cajol'd by ſuch horrid Inſinuations.

Well, now he comes to his dear beloved Militia, and tells us what wonders were done in *Ireland* by the *Iniskilling-Men*, and thoſe of *Londonderry*; but pray let us ſtop a little to conſider the matter, and not ſuffer this Phamphleteer to run away with Noiſe and Nonſenſe. The *Iniskilling Men* were People made deſperate by the Ruins of their Eſtates and Fortunes, almoſt weary of their Lives by the Cruelties and Hardſhips they ſuffer'd from the *Iriſh Papiſts*, having the cries of their Wives and Children, (labouring under the greateſt Miſeries) ever in their Ears, and the deplorable condition of their *Native Country* before their Eyes; beſide they were not a *Militia*, as our Author falſely boaſts, but were for the moſt part Gentlemen and others that fled from the Barbarities of the *Iriſh Papiſts* from all parts of *Ireland*, and gather'd in a Body for their ſecurity at *Iniskilling*, and great Numbers of them Officers and private Soldiers

of

of the Army, whom *Tryconnel* had Disbanded becauſe Proteſtants, Men that had been in Pay and Diſcipline a great part of the Reign of King *Chales* the II. So that 'tis a miſtake to ſay they were a *Militia*; farther, if it be conſider'd whom they fought with, there's none will wonder at what they did, they encountred poor ſenſeleſs wretches that knew not their Right hands from their Left; and always look behind them when they draw their Swords. And if theſe are the Wonders they boaſt of, they had as good be ſilent, and ſay nothing of the matter.

In the next Page he ſays, *at laſt by our great Armies and Fleets, and the conſtant Expence of maintaining them, we were too hard for the OEconomy, Skill, and Policy of* France, *and notwithſtanding all our difficulties, brought them to terms both Safe and Honourable.* Did we ſo *Sir.* then I think we have very little reaſon to complain, and if our *Fleet and Armies* procur'd us this Peace, They only can preſerve it; by parting with *either* we make it precarious, and to depend meerly on the *Generoſity* of an Enemy, who is not us'd to be firmer to his Word than his Intereſt; ſeveral true ſenſible *Engliſhmen* are of the opinion, that the longer we maintain a *Standing Armed Force*, we ſhall be the longer from having Occaſion to make uſe of them; but that on the contrary, the ſooner we *Disband* them, the ſooner we ſhall be put to the trouble and charge of raiſing New; For 'tis certainly true, that that Nation which is moſt *able* to wage War, will be the unlikelieſt to be put to the trouble of it.

But

But here he ſays, *I ſhall omit giving any account of the Conduct of our Fleet during this War, how few Advantages we reap'd by it, and how many occaſions was loſt of Deſtroying the* French; *only thus much I will Obſerve, that tho' a great part of it may be attributed to the Negligence, Ignorance, or Treachery of Inferior Officers, yet it cou'd not univerſally happen* (the Gentleman is poſitive in what he ſays) *and unpuniſh'd too, notwithſtanding the Clamours of the Merchants, and repeated complaints in Parliament, unleſs the Cauſe had laid deeper.* Now this Gentleman ſhou'd take care to be well inform'd, before he ſo poſſitively Aſſerts things of this Nature; he may be call'd on to give an Account of his knowledge in the Affairs he pretends to be ſo well acquainted with, and it may go very hard with him if he can't prove what he Affirms, and produce Grounds for his malicious Inſinuations; but if he is inform'd of the Nature of Affairs, and ſo well knows the miſcarriages that have befell us, where the Source and Original of them lay, their ſecret Springs and Movements; he ought, eſpecially ſince he pretends to be ſuch a *Patriot*, to have pointed out the Perſons, diſcover'd the Authors, and openly accus'd them to the World; for *God* be thanked, none need be ſilent now in a juſt Cauſe, none need be afraid or backward to reveal the Truth; we are unacquainted with *Threats* and *Cloſettings* ſo frequent in the *late Reigns*, and are neither Brib'd nor terrified out of the Truth; if they are only his own private Suggeſtions, and Chimera's rais'd and fomented by his own ill Humors, he ought to have forbore them, particuly at this time of Day, when they may embroil the King and Parliament into Heats and Jealouſies of each

each other, which might create greater hardſhips to the Nation, than the whole ten Years War, and might prove more fatal in the end.

However, to ſatisfie theſe murmuring Gentlemen in this point, we may give very good reaſons that our Affairs at Sea were not manag'd to more advantage, and alſo that they are not capable of being better manag'd without our having a *Land Force* at home; for the *French King* found his Account lay in *Pyrating* on our Merchants, where ſomething was to be had, rather than in Fighting our Fleets, where, beſides the Uncertainty of Victory, nothing but dry Blows were to be gain'd; whereas, by taking our Trading Veſſels, he not only impoveriſh'd us, but at the ſame time enrich'd himſelf, which was a double advantage; and to hinder this Misfortune there was no way but one, that was the dividing our Fleet, as he did his, into ſeveral ſmall Squadrons, and ſend them Cruiſing, and Coaſting about in all places where our Merchants had any buſineſs; but then the Remedy wou'd have been worſe than the Diſeaſe; for we ſhou'd have left ourſelves *Open* and *Unguarded*, at a time when our King was out of the Nation, and all our Forces in *Flanders*; and I believe the *French* wou'd ſcarce have let ſlip'd the opportunity of Invading us, and hardly fail'd of making their Advantage of ſuch an Over-ſight. This I think is enough to convince theſe *Purblind Politicians* of the *Neceſſity* of a *Standing Army*; for if a War ſhou'd break out again, having a *Land Force* to ſecure us, our Fleet may divide themſelves, and either block our Enemies in their own Ports, or attend and Convoy

our

our Merchants in all places of Danger, ſo hinder our Enemies from Enriching themſelves by our Loſſes; Whereas, if we are without a *Land Force* ſufficient to Protect us, our *Naval Forces* cou'd take little care of our Merchants (whereby they wou'd every where, become an eaſie Prey to the Enemies Privateers) for they muſt keep together in a Body at home, to be able to ſecure us from Invaſions, leaſt our Enemies ſhou'd come upon us; ſo while we were Protecting our Trade, we might loſe the Kingdom.

Now he comes to his Computations, which as I ſaid, ſignifie nothing to the purpoſe, unleſs it be to make us rejoyce that we are in ſo good a Condition to reſiſt our *Enemies Abroad*, for I know of none we have at home; if he knows of any, let him ſpeak out, which I ſuppoſe is more than he is willing to do: 'Tis generally obſerv'd of ſuch as make the greateſt Noiſe and Stir, that they are always the readieſt to pull in their Horns, and cry they know nothing of the matter. Beſides when he was computing, 'twou'd have been but a little more trouble to have inform'd us the Number of the *French Forces*, and what Troops the *Dutch* and other Nations have in Pay, this wou'd have been very convenient, we might have known the *Strength* of our *Neighbours* as well as our ſelves, and then perhaps thought it might be prudent to keep it up in ſome tolerable degree of equality with theirs; this I am perſuaded would be the natural reſult of our reflecting on their great Strength.

If indeed this Gentleman, or any of his Adherents, cou'd actually engage our *Neighbours* to *Disband their Forces*, we ſhou'd no longer diſpute this point with him,

but I ſuppoſe this is more than he will promiſe; therefore ſince all around us are in Arms, and entertain *vaſt Numbers of Armed Troops* in conſtant Pay, 'twou'd be a fatal blot in our Politicks to part with ours; for, *ſince the Practice is grown ſo general, No King or Prince, tho' endowed with never ſo peaceable a Spirit, and never ſo deſirous of being at eaſe, dares lead the Dance and diſarm, for fear of his Armed Neighbours, whoſe Neceſſities or Ambition make them wait only for an opportunity to fall upon him that is worſt provided to make reſiſtance.* So that while our *Neighbours* keep up their *Standing Forces*, 'tis evident we muſt do ſo, unleſs we will ſubmit our ſelves to be Inſulted by them.

Farther, when this Gentleman tells us the greatneſs of our *Standing Forces* now, and that in former Days they were very inconſiderable, he only lets us know juſt as much as will ſerve his own turn and no more, for there's a vaſt alteration crept into the very Conſtitution of our Government within theſe hundred and fifty Years; formerly the Nobility and Gentry held their Poſſeſſions and Lands from the Crown by *Knight's Service*, and ſo were always bound to attend on their Kings in his Wars with certain Numbers of Armed Men, according to the Tenure and Extent of their ſeveral Lordſhips or Lands, and they had their *Villains or Vaſſals*, who, by a like Tenure from them, were oblig'd to wait on their reſpective Lords or Landlords, when requir'd for the Service of their King and Country, and that they might not be Undiſciplin'd when they were call'd for, every Pariſh was to take care that all Boys ſhou'd at ſet times Exerciſe the Arms then in Uſe, as Shooting in Bows, handling the Battle Ax, and ſuch like; ſo that by this Method there was no occaſion for any great

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Standing Force, for the People were Soldiers themſelves, and might be rais'd on any ſudden Occaſion, by the Kings giving Notice to the Nobility and Gentry of his want of their Service, and by their immediate Summoning their *Vaſſals* for the Attendance they were bound to pay. 'Twill be immediately reply'd why may it not be ſo now, by this means we might rid our ſelves of the fears of a *Standing Army*, and yet be able to defend our ſelves, or Annoy our Enemy. To this I anſwer, I ſhou'd be very glad if ſome ſuch Method cou'd be taken now, and a *Militia* formed capable of managing their ſhare of War, and ſupporting our Credit and Reputation Abroad in the World, without our being put to the Uneaſineſs and Expence of a *Standing Force*, for I am not ſo raſh as to affirm a *Standing Army* to be at all a *Benefit* or *Advantage* to the Nation, if it might be diſpens'd with on good Terms, no, rather quite the contrary, I think the only Reaſon, that can be giving for the keeping a *Standing Force* in Pay, is *Neceſſity*: But I hardly think a *Militia* can be form'd to ſerve our occaſions now. For,

Firſt, by the cunning and contrivance of Humane reach and Invention, and the charge of Times and Accidents, War now is become a Trade, it conſiſts not ſo much in ſtrength of Body, or a real Courage, as in Slight and Witt; to be able to fortifie Camps and Towns, to draw your Enemy into Ambuſcades, or drill him along into diſadvantageous Places, to be able to draw him to Battle, or ſecure your ſelf from being forc'd to one, theſe are now the beſt Martial Qualifications, and theſe are things muſt be learnt by *Uſe* and *Practice*, none can be perfect in them but by *Experience*, there muſt be an *Apprenticeſhip* ſerv'd for the learning them.

This I think is ſufficient, to make us believe that a *Militia* can very hardly be ſo regulated, as to prove uſeful at this time of Day.

2*dly*, Suppoſing a *Militia* might be brought to good Diſcipline and Order, yet 'twou'd be a very great while before ſuch a thing cou'd be done, and wou'd theſe inconſiderate Gentlemen have us leave our ſelves *Naked* and *Open* all the time, this wou'd be an Imprudence that our Enemies perhaps wou'd be glad to find us guilty of, ſince I believe they only wou'd be the gainers by it.

3*dly*, Tho' our *Militia* was ſerviceable, yet we ſhou'd find very few of them forward to go over to any Foreign Parts, where it might be convenient and neceſſary for us to employ our Forces, for they wou'd be Men that were ſettled and fixt by Wives and Families at home, whereas our *Standing Forces* (the Private Soldiers) are moſt of them Men that have no fixt Habitations are not ty'd at home by Wives and Families, but taken either young before they had ſettled themſelves, or moſtly from among thoſe that were Vagabonds, and Wanderers, that had no buſineſs, and were rather a Burthen than Benefit to their Country, but by being put into the Army are now become uſeful and beneficial to it; whereas if they are Disbanded, what can be expected from ſuch people, who are not fixt at home by the tye of Families or Intereſt, but to go abroad, and enter into any Service that will be ſo kind as to entertain them; and who can blame them, ſince they know no other way of Livelihood; the Conſequence of which thing alone might fright us from what theſe Gentlemen wou'd have us immediately do, and make us very cautious how we part from that Force, which have done

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us so much good even when they were but learning their Trade, which at our Cost and Expences they have learnt so well as to be Masters of; but by Disbanding them, and turning them abroad, we give our Neighbours the opportunity of reaping the Profit and Advantage.

But this Gentleman tells us *we need not send Forces into Foreign Parts, we need only have a strong Fleet at Sea, and that wou'd be security enough:* But I think the Practice of all our Kings and Parliaments, as I have already Instanc'd, may be enough to confute one part of this Assertion; for I take it, our Fore Fathers were as wise and knowing in what concern'd their Interest, as any of us now can pretend to; and if we look back into former Stories we shall find enough to convince us of the folly of trusting too much to the other part; by seeing what has happen'd, we shall quickly find that a Fleet will not secure us from Invasions. To give some Instances to these Positive Gentlemen, How often did the *Danes* land great Numbers of Armed Forces, in almost every part of this Island? continually alarming the poor People, ruining and making horrible devastations wherever they came; exercising all manner of Barbarities on the poor unprovided *English*, putting whole Towns, Men, Women and Children to the Sword; till at last they Lorded it over the whole Island; and perhaps there are a People in the World, wou'd not be much civiller on an occasion, which God forbid they shou'd ever have; and which while we have a good Army, we need not fear; but to give some more Instances. *William* the Conqueror landed with an Army here, so did his Son *Robert*, Duke of *Normandy*, in the Reign of *William Rufus*, and in the Reign of *Henry* the First. The Empress

Empreſs *Maud* landed an Army in the Reign of King *Stephen*, ſo did *Henry* II. The *French* Invaded the Land in the Reign of *Henry* III. Queen *Iſabel* landed with an Army at *Orwel*, in *Suſſex*, in the Reign of *Edward* the Second. *Henry* the Seventh landed with an Army, tho' *Richard* the Third took all poſſible care to hinder him. And whenever there have been heats and diſcontents in this Kingdom, the *French* have ever aſſiſted one or another party to keep up the Contention; tho' our Princes by their Fleets have always endeavour'd to hinder it. Theſe are enough to convince every lover of his Country, of the falſity of theſe Gentlemen's, ſaying that a Fleet only is able to protect us.

Perhaps they will object againſt what has been ſaid, and ſay, That in thoſe days we were weak at Sea, but that now we are grown much ſtronger. So is our Neighbours too, as we very well know by experience; I ſcarce think any of theſe angry Gentlemen will venture to affirm, that we are at this time, the moſt potent at Sea, or that none of our Neighbours dare to look us in the face on that Element; whereas in former days, tho' we were but mean at Sea, in compariſon of what we are now; yet our Neighbours were much meaner, we were formerly confeſſedly the moſt powerful in Shipping, and enjoyed an abſolute and uncontroul'd dominion on the Seas; and if in thoſe days, when we bore ſo great a ſway on the Ocean, and all the Nations around us ſo little, a Fleet cou'd not hinder Armies from landing in *England*; I can't think how it ſhou'd do it now, when our Neighbours are as ſtrong in Shipping, and as Powerful at Sea as our Selves. This I think is a plain caſe, an Argument ſo clear, that I wonder how any ſenſible perſons can overlook it. And if we may be Invaded, tho'

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we have a good Fleet, as 'tis plain we may, we shou'd be careful how we parted with a Land Force; which wou'd then be our only safety, and can be no Injury at all to us, as long as his Majesty is so clearly in the Interest of his People.

All this great Clamour and Noise against a *Standing Army*, can have no other meaning than this, That they dare not trust his Majesty, or rely on his Integrity; these are hard things, and a very ungrateful way of dealing with a Prince, who has all his Life-time hazarded his Person for the relief and succour of the Distressed; who cou'd never be wrought upon, either by bribes or menaces, to be unjust to his word, even in the smallest particle; a Prince whose single Reputation caused a strict band and Union amongst Princes of the most disagreeing Interests, Humours, and Religions. That this Prince shou'd be mistrusted by a People of the *same Religion*, is a thing wonderful and surprizing; and will hardly be credited in after Ages, especially when they shall know that he *rescued these same People from the Jaws of Slavery and Popery*; and sav'd them just sinking into the Pit of Destruction; but this is more than these Gentlemen dare openly own; therefore they complain against the *Court*, and the *Government*; concealing their base Reflections and ill-manner'd Insinuations, under double and ambiguous meanings; but the skreen is too thin and transparent; 'tis easily seen through, and their thoughts as readily apprehended as if they had writ them at length.

But to go on with this Gentleman, and come to his *Crisis*, Page 42, where he says, *several Accidents concur to make the Disbanding of an Army practicable which may not happen again.* To be even with him, and give him

him a *Rowland* for his *Oliver*; several Accidents concur to oblige us to keep up a *Standing Army* here, which never did happen, nor never may again: There's a King beyond Sea, who maintains pretensions to the Crown, with a Prince whom he owns to be his Lawful Son and Heir; so young that he may live according to an indifferent Computation these 40 Years or more, and tho' they may seem quiet and dormant for a time, yet 'tis hardly to be expected they will let slip any opportunity they may think favourable to the regaining their pretended Rights; 'tis to be consider'd also, that they are of a Religion which no Oaths can bind or secure, when their Church will be a gainer by the Breach of them; add to this, that this Nation has been always the bar and hindrance to all the ambitious designs and Projects of that Communion, and this has created an incurable hatred in them towards us, which they never fail to let us know upon all occasions; so that we have all the reason in the World to look about us, especially, considering there are such Multitudes against us, and so few to assist us; 'tis true we have just made a Peace, after a chargeable and Expensive War; but as 'twas the *Number and Valour of our Troops* that forc't it from an Ambitious and inveterate Enemy; so nothing but the *same* can preserve it to us; for we are all pretty confident, that he whom we have had to deal with, has not been tender in breaking the most solemn Leagues, when either his Interest or Ambition has thought it convenient.

Besides we see he has not deliver'd *Brisack* to the Emperour, which he ought to have done, but finds pretences to delay it till Spring, and we know not whether he'l do it then or no, unless he finds he shall be forc't to it. Add to these, the great Number of *Jacobites* we have at home,

Who

who are a People reſtleſs and uneaſie; ready to Plot and execute any baſe and Villainous deſigns: Add alſo, that the King of *Spain* lies a dying, and the King of *France* has *great Armies* ready to enter into that Country; at ſo favourable a Juncture, to ſupport the right he pretends to that Crown; I ſay, all theſe things truly conſider'd, *Here's a concurrence of Circumſtances that never happen'd at once till now, nor perhaps never may again, that call upon us, and oblige us to keep up our Standing Forces at this Time.*

I think I have ſaid enough to convince any reaſonable Perſons of the Neceſſity of an Army at this time; which is all need be done, to anſwer this *Hiſtorian*; for if there is a neceſſity of an Army, 'tis certain it ſhou'd be one that may be ſufficient and able to cope with any force our Enemies may bring againſt us; or elſe we had as good have none at all: In former times when our Neighbours had but *five* or *ten thouſand* Men in Arms there was no occaſion for our having a greater Number; but if they encreaſe to a Hundred thouſand or more, we muſt alſo be in ſome tolerable degree equal with them, or be contented to be Inſulted or Invaded by thoſe that are ſtronger; this is ſo very plain and clear, I ſhall argue it no farther, but ſhew the danger of truſting to a *Militia*, when they are attack'd by regular and diſciplin'd Troops and ſo conclude,

And the *Want* of a ſufficient Number of Standing and Diſciplin'd Troops may be learnt from the *Dutch*, who were almoſt brought to the brink of ruin, in the Year 1672, when the *French*, who ſeldom fail to make their advantages of the over-ſites and Neglects of their Neighbours; Invaded them with mighty Armies, which

like a Torrent over-run Three large Provinces, taking above Forty ſtrong Towns in almoſt as many days. Whoever reads Sir *William Temple*'s Obſervations, will find that Great Man makes out the *want of regular Standing Forces*, one of the chief reaſons of their Misfortunes, which had like to have been the utter Ruin of their Commonwealth; he ſays, *it was their too great parſimony in disbanding the beſt of their Foreign Officers and Troops, after the Peace of* Munſter; he tells us, *thoſe Miniſters who had the Directions of Affairs, bent their Chief application to the Strength and Order of their Fleet, and totally Neglected their Land Army*; ſo that thoſe few Souldiers they had were without Diſcipline. Theſe were the Reaſons made the *French* King ſuppoſe their Conqueſt Eaſie, and invited him to invade them, and upon Tryal he found he was not miſtaken, for they were not able to reſiſt him; tho' 'tis Obſervable that for Twenty Years before, they had been regulating their *Militia*, and endeavouring to make it ſerviceable, but 'twas ſo far from being ſo, that they ſuffer'd the *French* to become Maſters of their ſtrong *Fortified Towns* almoſt as ſoon as they approach'd them, this is ſo lively and near an Example and ſo well fitted for our Inſtruction, that methinks we ſhou'd take warning by it, without deſiring to make the Experiment our ſelves.

Fælix quem faciunt aliena pericula Cautum.

How often has *Poland*, (a Country theſe Gentlemen are pleas'd to produce as an Inſtance of ſupporting themſelves by a *Militia*) been ravag'd and Inſulted by the *Sweeds*, *Muſcovites*, and *Tartars*, and ſuffer'd all the Extremities of Fire and Sword *for the want of Standing and Regular Troops.*

Now

Now I think I have ſufficiently ſhew'd the weakneſs of theſe Gentlemen's Arguments, and the *abſolute Neceſſity* for our keeping up a *Land Force*, not by *falſe Computations* of things, but by a true conſideration of the preſent Circumſtances of Affairs, which is the only means to find the right of this Matter; So that I hope no true *Engliſhman*, who deſires the good of his Country, will be for the *Disbanding the Forces* till either our Neighbours have done the ſame, or that our *Militia* be ſo well regulated, that they may be able to Cope with any *Diſciplin'd Troops* whatſoever.

For ſuppoſing, on our *Immediate Disbanding our Forces* any of our Neighbours ſhou'd think it the Critical time to attempt an Invaſion of *England*, before our *Militia* was ready to receive them, and this is none of the unlikelieſt Suppoſitions, wou'd ask theſe Gentlemen, if we ſhou'd not have ſome Reaſons for apprehending of of danger, when we have only the Succeſs of a Fleet to depend on, ſeveral Accidents might happen to render it unſerviceable to us, as our being kept in Port by contrary Winds, or our not being in a readineſs enough to hinder them, theſe are no very Improbable things, we have had the knowledge of their Poſſibility by Experience, and I ſay, imagining it happen'd that we were Invaded, I deſire to know what reſiſtance our *Militia* cou'd make againſt 20 *or* 30 *Thouſand Regular Troops* well Diſciplin'd and inur'd the War; we ſhou'd then *wiſh* for our *Forces* when they were not to be had, nay perhaps when a conſiderable Number of them were liſted in the Enemies Service, having been ſo ungratefully us'd here as to be turn'd looſe to Want and Miſery, after having ſpent their Youth and Blood in our Service; and what Nation wou'd pitty us? Wou'd not all the

World

World cry out we deſervedly fell Martyrs of our Folly? that we cou'd blame none but our ſelves, for that our ſelves only were the Authors of our Deſtruction.

After all that can be ſaid on both ſides, and to ſuppoſe even all the Idle Chimeras theſe *Grumbletonians* wou'd fright us with, the whole matter abſolutely depends on our cooſing one of theſe two things, viz. *either to truſt King* William *or King* Lewis.

FINIS.